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Abstract. Virtual Enterprises are a major trend in enterprise interoperability, 
configuring cooperative settings in which different parties temporarily share 
their resources towards a common goal. Virtual Enterprises are created in very 
dynamic environments, and their temporary nature demands for quick set-up 
phases. In truly open settings, virtual enterprises may comprise business entities 
whose previous performance record may not be assessed. Contracts formalizing 
norms of behavior are needed to allow for verification of cooperative business 
compliance. Contracts also provide a coarse-grained specification of business 
processes, enough for verifying observance to promised cooperative efforts. In 
this paper we relate these issues to the increasingly important dichotomy in 
multi-agent systems: autonomy and openness vs. regulation. We present our 
approach, including agent-based services provided inside a regulated environ-
ment – an electronic institution. We then give particular emphasis to contract 
formalization through norms, their monitoring and enforcement. Our approach 
assigns contexts to norms, configuring a structured view that addresses the pos-
sibility of creating different agents’ cooperation agreements inside the overall 
framework. 
1   Introduction 
Virtual Enterprises (VE) are a major trend in enterprise interoperability. Some of the 
key aspects of an evermore dynamic business environment are specialization and 
dynamism. The VE concept has been applied to many forms of cooperative business, 
such as outsourcing, supply chains, or temporary consortiums. We are mainly inter-
ested in the latter, as it addresses the need for flexible and dynamic alliances between 
enterprises. Thus, a VE has been defined as “a temporary consortium of autonomous, 
diverse and possibly geographically dispersed organizations that pool their resources 
to meet short-term objectives and exploit fast-changing market trends” [4]. 
We distinguish a VE from a tight integration of two business entities in outsourcing 
or supply chain configurations. In those cases, information technology approaches are 
focused on managing inter-organizational workflows, providing a fine-grained en-
gagement between parties that leads to middle- or long-term relationships. We focus 
on more flexible and dynamic relationships, which are required for small and medium 
enterprises to prosper in a very competitive market. 
In “breeding environments” [1] potential partners are already acquaintances and 
typically have previous common business experiences. This facilitates the construction 
of business agreements, as parties can rely on relational contracts [6], which specify 
continuous relationships that are naturally self-enforceable. Instead of relying on a 
third-party authority, a relational contract is based on repeated interactions and social 
norms, representing an informal agreement sustained by the value of future relation-
ships. If, however, we consider truly open environments, the assumption that previous 
performance records may be assessed no longer holds. Therefore, a VE may comprise 
business entities that have never worked together in the past. 
Generally, formal contracts are preferred when establishing relationships between 
unknown parties. On the other hand, regular partners rely on implicit relationships, 
supported by trust and by the threat of withholding business from anyone who has 
broken a promise in the past. In this paper we mainly address the former case, devel-
oping on the use of explicit contractual specifications. 
We focus on contracts specifying explicit behavior norms at the business level, 
used for verification of partners’ compliance to their contractual promises. Further-
more, in the case of contracts formalizing VE relationships, they also describe a 
coarse-grained specification of the underlying multiparty business process. This al-
lows for verifying partners’ observance to promised cooperation efforts. The actual 
contract performance may be achieved, e.g., using Service-oriented Architectures, 
which enable business interoperability integration at the information technology level. 
Nonetheless, a link must be established between this and the business level, where the 
agreed-upon commitments are specified. 
Some recent discussions within the multi-agent systems research community are 
closely related to the exposed concerns. The multi-agent paradigm allows us to tackle 
with important issues in the VE scenario, namely in the formation and operation stages 
of the VE life-cycle. The usual methodology consists of having agents representing 
different business entities (e.g. enterprises), which then use negotiation and coordina-
tion skills to create and perform cooperative business agreements. While agent theory 
describes agents as autonomous self-interested entities, preferably interacting in open 
environments, an important issue arises when attempting to apply agents in real world 
scenarios: how to ensure cooperative outcomes in scenarios populated with self-
interested agents? A possible answer to this problem is to regulate the environment, 
providing incentives for cooperative behavior through normative constraints [2]. 
In this paper we present our approach towards an agent-based electronic institution 
providing services for assisting and regulating the construction and operation of VE 
configurations. We focus on the specification of norms as a means to regulate an open 
environment, allowing for contracts to be specified in a way amenable to monitoring 
and enforcement activities. In section 2 we present institutional services assisting the 
VE formation and operation stages. Section 3 addresses the issue of norms and rules 
regulating the environment, both from an institutional point of view and for specifying 
contractual agreements. Section 4 points our directions towards implementing contract 
monitoring and enforcement services. Section 5 concludes. 
2   Institutional Services for Virtual Enterprises 
The concept of electronic institution (EI) has been proposed to regulate the interaction 
among software agents. The benefit of an EI resides in its potential to assure legiti-
macy and security to its members, through the establishment of norms [5]. Besides 
enforcing norms, institutional services should be provided to assist the coordination 
efforts between agents which, representing different real-world entities, interact to-
wards the establishment of business relationships. 
 
Fig. 1. Services of an Electronic Institution 
Our approach regards an EI as a comprehensive framework providing a set of insti-
tutional services, while assuring norm enforcement through sanction and reputation 
mechanisms. As the establishment of business engagements is central to our purposes, 
we consider an evolving normative environment, including formalizations of “hand-
shakes” by means of contracts that the EI monitors and enforces. We may summarize 
the main goals of an EI as follows: (1) to support agent interaction as a coordination 
framework, making the establishment of business agreements more efficient; and (2) 
to provide a level of trust by offering an enforceable normative environment. These 
two issues are closely related to the lifecycle of contractual relationships, namely 
information discovery, contract negotiation and execution. In the particular case of 
VEs, [12] examines the different stages of their lifecycle, and focuses on advanced 
negotiation features for the formation stage. In this paper we integrate the formation 
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and execution stages within the EI environment, establishing a connection between 
negotiation protocols and the expression of their outcome as contracts. 
Considering both goals identified above, we identify agent-based services for con-
tract establishment, monitoring and enforcement (see figure 1, also in [9]). 
The establishment of contractual agreements is supported with negotiation media-
tion, based on appropriate negotiation protocols and contract templates, defined using 
an institutional ontology. This ontology relates to general contract-related terms. On-
tology-based services facilitate the matching process, assisting the interaction of 
agents using different domain ontologies. These services are important if we aim at 
keeping an open setting; inside a “breeding environment” common domain ontologies 
might prevail. The use of templates greatly simplifies the creation of contractual rela-
tionships: templates provide a structure on which negotiation can be based, limiting it 
to the instantiation of template parameters into a mutually agreeable contract. 
The validation and registration of contracts allows for their “legal” existence. Con-
tracts are created as a result of a successful negotiation. However, we do not assume 
that agents will always have their negotiations mediated within the EI. As such, agents 
may opt to use institutional services for compliance checking only. 
An enforceable normative environment is established by rendering a contract moni-
toring and enforcement service, which registers transactions and verifies norm appli-
cability, as well as the fulfillment of signed contracts. 
Every agent intending to use an institutional service must be registered as a mem-
ber. Agents have, inside the EI’s boundaries, a record of reputation concerning their 
observance to past contractual relationships. At a later stage of our work, the informa-
tion in these records will allow for relational contracts to be built. 
3   Norms and Contracts 
The monitoring and enforcement of contracts is achieved by considering the EI as a 
normative framework. E-contracts are achieved inside this controlled environment, 
which establishes certain rules of behavior to be followed by members, ensuring a 
level of trust that is crucial to the interaction of heterogeneous, independently devel-
oped and privately owned agents. The EI imposes a set of institutional norms, not by 
preventing any deviation from those norms, but instead by ensuring that norm viola-
tion is penalized. 
Besides mere purchase contracts, we are interested in representing VE relationships 
by specifying what we call constitutional norms. Agents will negotiate to establish 
dynamic VEs, which stipulate cooperation terms, may exist for a period of time, and 
are meant to achieve an overall business goal. In order to protect that purpose they 
must take into account possible misconduct of partners, which may at times have to be 
replaced. There will typically be a dominant participant, not necessarily for coordinat-
ing the whole activity, but because it embodies the final destination of products (as far 
as the consortium is concerned). This entity can be regarded as a customer (the one 
that creates a need to be fulfilled by the VE [12]), but can also participate in the pro-
duction process. 
Considering this setting, we conceive a structured normative framework [10] com-
prising institutional, constitutional and operational norms. 
Institutional norms include default contract clauses (or default clause values) that 
allow concrete contracts to be underspecified, facilitating their creation. General regu-
lations concerning the nature of consortiums may also be defined; this type of policies 
mirrors existing laws that are created to rule particular aspects of a society. Therefore, 
agents can rely on these regulations as a ground basis to raise VE contractual formal-
izations. Rules that recognize violation or fulfillment conditions are also defined at 
this level, as these are contract-independent concepts. Furthermore, specific policies 
may be defined towards institutional penalizing of violations (e.g. through reputation 
mechanisms). 
VE constitutional norms describe the terms of cooperation that parties commit to. 
Our first approach considers that each partner will state workloads and prices for its 
contribution, and that a general business process outline is specified. This umbrella 
agreement represents a set of norms that parties adhere to, and which set up the 
ground for the VE operation phase. 
Specific contracts indicating actions to be performed make up the third normative 
layer. Operational contracts are proposed and signed within the context of VE contrac-
tual agreements, and their creation and execution are subject to enforcement and 
monitoring procedures. 
In this section we provide a simple representation of norms, addressing their use in 
contracts and VE cooperation agreements. We use the Prolog notation conventions for 
variables and relations, although our rule-based approach is founded on general first-
order logic. 
3.1   Representing Norms 
Following our normative framework, we regard norms as rules prescribing behavior, 
subject to a certain context. Therefore, a norm is something like: 
 
[Context] Situation → Prescription 
 
The Context indicates the scope of the norm; as such, we may have norms applica-
ble inside the whole institution, while other norms may be defined for a particular VE. 
The Situation describes when the norm is in place. The Prescription specifies what 
should be accomplished in order to the norm to be fulfilled. 
Using this representation, norms obviously lend themselves to a rule-based imple-
mentation. The situation part refers to the rule conditions, whereas the prescription 
part corresponds to the rule’s effects. 
Behavior norms prescribe the expected behavior of agents. Usually, such norms 
specify states of affairs that must be brought about by an agent before a certain dead-
line. Therefore, we consider obligations as the means to express the prescription of 
behavior norms. Obligations have the following structure: 
 
[Context] obligation(Bearer, InstitutionalFact, Deadline) 
 
Instead of dictating the precise action an agent must perform, we prescribe the insti-
tutional fact (see below) that he must bring about. This enables an agent to delegate or 
outsource tasks conducting to the accomplishment of a state of affairs, while still be-
ing responsible before the institution for the (un)fulfillment of the obligation. 
3.2   Representing Transactions 
In our institutional setting transactions are recorded in an appropriate repository, 
which is used to verify the fulfillment of contractual obligations. We represent such 
transactions as facts that are acknowledged by the institution. Their representation 
becomes: 
 
[Context] ifact(IFact, Timestamp) 
 
where IFact refers to the reported transaction, and Timestamp registers the moment in 
which such a fact occurred. Just as norms, institutional facts have an associated con-
text. Therefore, a fact denoting the fulfillment of an obligation occurs within the con-
text in which that obligation is in place. For instance, a payment would refer to an 
invoice issued within a certain contract. 
In this paper we refrain ourselves from giving formal details about how institutional 
facts come about. Briefly, they are inferred from appropriate messages issued by ap-
propriate institutional agents, that is, agents providing specific institutional services, 
such as banking, delivery tracking, or messaging. These may be rendered as Web 
services, and permit a certified acknowledgement of real-world transactions. Section 4 
briefly addresses this subject. 
3.3   Representing Simple Contracts 
General contracts for purchase operations between a customer and a vendor can be 
specified by an institutional fact stating that such a contract is in place, together with a 
set of behavior norms representing contract clauses that prescribe the expected behav-
ior of contracting parties. A simple example would be: 
 
[] ifact(purchase_contract(IdPC, Customer, Vendor, Item, Quantity, Price), PCTime) 
 
[purchase_contract:IdPC] obligation(Vendor, delivery(_, Item, Quantity, Customer), PCTime+10) 
 
[purchase_contract:IdPC] fulfilled(Vendor, delivery(_, Item, Quantity, Customer), TD) 
→ obligation(Customer, payment(_, Price, Vendor), TD+30) 
 
The syntax is simplified for greater readability: in this representation, we assume 
variable names have contract scope (as opposed to Prolog’s clause scope). The ab-
sence of a designated agent in institutional facts indicates that such tasks may be dele-
gated (that is, the agent achieving the necessary actions may be other than the obliga-
tion’s bearer). Within a norm, literals either in the situation or in the prescription part 
are dependent on the context of the norm. 
Sanctioning Norms. Behavior norms may be complemented with sanctioning norms 
that prescribe new (presumably harder) obligations in case of violation. The general 
structure of a sanctioning norm is as follows. 
 
[Context] violated(Bearer, IFact, Deadline) → obligation(Bearer, NewIFact, NewDeadline) 
 
This norm states that if the agent identified as the bearer for the achievement of an 
institutional fact fails to do so by a certain deadline, then a new obligation is assigned 
to him. Thus, a violation imposes a new obligation on the prevaricator. 
3.4   Detecting the Fulfillment and Violation of Obligations 
Contextualized institutional facts are used to verify the fulfillment of obligations. For 
this, we define an obligation fulfillment rule applicable to all contexts (that is, to any 
contractual relationship monitored by the EI): 
 
[Context] ifact(IFact, T) ∧ obligation(Bearer, IFact, Deadline) ∧ T<Deadline 
→ fulfilled(Bearer, IFact, T) 
 
This rule indicates that if an institutional fact prescribed by an obligation is 
achieved before its deadline, then that obligation is fulfilled. As with behavior norms, 
literals within the rule are dependent on its context. That is, if an obligation within a 
certain contract is accomplished, the fulfillment of such obligation occurs, obviously, 
inside that same contract. However, this norm is institutional, in that it applies to all 
contractual relations; it thus has un-instantiated context. 
This rule is fundamental for enabling the chaining of obligations within a contrac-
tual relationship. It establishes a connection between the institutional facts that are 
added and the pending obligations. 
The connection between behavior norms and sanctioning norms is achieved 
through violation detection mechanisms. These are based on violation detection rules, 
which fire when deadlines have elapsed. For this we consider time events, which are 
generated as institutional facts indicating the elapsing of the moments when obliga-
tions are due. 
 
[Context] 
ifact(time, Deadline) ∧ obligation(Bearer, IFact, Deadline) ∧ not(fulfilled(Bearer, IFact, _)) 
→ violated(Bearer, IFact, Deadline) 
 
This violation detection rule reads that in any context, if a deadline referring to an 
obligation was reached, and such obligation was not fulfilled, then a violation oc-
curred (in the same context). 
The resulting fact stating that a violation has occurred may be used in several ways: 
it may affect an agent’s reputation; it can constrain the agent’s further actions, making 
it possible to define prohibitions based on violations; it can be used to interdict agent 
access to institutional services; or it may be used in a less severe way, simply by pre-
scribing new obligations to be attended, as specified in the contract. 
This approach allows us to distinguish violation detection from sanction imposition 
mechanisms. While the detection of violations is a general and institutionally defined 
concept, the prescription of sanctions may be contract-specific. 
3.5   Representing Virtual Enterprise Cooperation Agreements 
A cooperation agreement aggregates the organization’s constitutional information, 
including the cooperation effort parties commit to, and their general business process 
flow. In this subsection we illustrate how to specify this, considering situations where 
the intended cooperation corresponds to the exchange of resources. 
An institutional fact registers that a cooperation agreement is in effect within a 
group of agents, each ensuring a specific cooperation effort. The following templates 
are used to specify this information: 
 
[] ifact(cooperation_agreement(IdCA, Participants, Resources), CATime) 
 
[cooperation_agreement:IdCA] 
coop_effort(Participant, Resource, MinQuantity, MaxQuantity, Frequency, UnitPrice) 
 
[cooperation_agreement:IdCA] business_process(From, Resource, To) 
 
Cooperation efforts indicate quantity ranges for the supply of resources, within a 
given frequency, together with agreed prices. Business process entries indicate the 
resources that are supposed to flow between participants. Their effective transfer, 
however, is dependent on appropriate requests. 
A minimum of one coop_effort fact per participant and per resource should be pre-
sent. Also, there should be at least one business_process fact for each coop_effort, and their 
agent-resource linkage must conform to the latter. The cooperation agreement contract 
should also verify that all participants and resources specified within cooperation 
effort and business process sections are part of the participants and resources declared 
in the institutional fact. These validations can be performed by the contract validation 
institutional service. 
Cooperation Agreement Intrinsic Norm. The central norm in respect to contractual 
promises represents the fact that each party is committed to its cooperation effort. As 
with other behavior norms, this translates to an obligation prescription: 
 
[cooperation_agreement:IdCA] 
ifact(request(Requester, Resource, Quantity, Answerer), TR) ∧ 
business_process(Answerer, Resource, Requester) ∧ 
coop_effort(Answerer, Resource, MinQt, MaxQt, Freq, _) ∧ 
calculate_performed_effort(Answerer, Resource, Freq, TR, PE) ∧ PE+Quantity<=MaxQt 
→ obligation(Answerer, acknowledge(Answerer, Resource, Quantity, Requester), TR+10) 
 
This norm is institutional: it applies to all cooperation agreements created inside the 
institution. Thus, as before, its context remains unbound until it is in use. Briefly, it 
reads that if a predicted request (considering the stated business process and coopera-
tion effort) is made in the context of a cooperation agreement, then the envisaged 
agent is obliged to accept it. An institutional procedure (calculate_performed_effort) is 
invoked for calculating the effort already performed by the agent within the time 
frame indicated in the cooperation effort frequency, taking into account the request 
time. If the agent does not exceed its promised efforts, the obligation comes into ef-
fect. 
Operational Contracts. Operational contracts are established in the context of a 
cooperation agreement. Institutional facts register their creation: 
 
[cooperation_agreement:IdCA] 
ifact(operational_contract(IdOC, Requester, Answerer, Resource, Quantity), OCTime) 
 
Considering parties’ cooperation commitments, operational contracts come into ex-
istence through an institutional rule of the form: 
 
[cooperation_agreement:IdCA] 
fulfilled(Answerer, acknowledge(Answerer, Resource, Quantity, Requester), TA) 
→ register_new_operational_contract(IdCA, Requester, Answerer, Resource, Quantity, TA) 
 
This rule applies to every cooperation agreement, and reads that when an agent ful-
fils its obligation to acknowledge a given request, a new operational contract comes 
into existence. 
The cooperation agreement may also specify how operational contracts are man-
aged, that is, what obligation chains implement such activity. Norms prescribing be-
haviour on operational contracts may thus be pre-specified when the cooperation 
agreement is created. 
One possibility is to consider operational contracts as purchase contracts using a 
predefined set of norms: 
 
[cooperation_agreement:IdCA] 
ifact(operational_contract(IdOC, Requester, Answerer, Resource, Qt), OCTime) ∧ 
coop_effort(Answerer, Resource, _, _, _, UnitPrice) 
→ ifact(purchase_contract(IdOC, Requester, Answerer, Resource, Qt, UnitPrice*Qt), OCTime) 
 
Another option would be to specify norms applicable to all operational contracts 
within a cooperation agreement. For instance, if delivery and payment should occur 
within an operational contract: 
 
[cooperation_agreement:IdCA, operational_contract:IdOC] 
obligation(Answerer, delivery(_,Resource, Quantity, Requester), OCTime+10) 
 
[cooperation_agreement:IdCA, operational_contract:IdOC] 
fulfilled(Answerer, delivery(_, Resource, Quantity, Requester), TD) ∧ 
coop_effort(Answerer, Resource, _, _, _, UnitPrice) 
→ obligation(Requester, payment(_, UnitPrice*Quantity, Answerer), TD+30) 
 
in which IdOC remains unbound, as these norms apply to all operational contracts 
which will be created in the future within agreement IdCA. 
If, however, nothing is pre-specified, then parties must negotiate the terms of op-
erational contracts every time one is created. If they do not, then an institutional de-
fault policy may be defined, applicable to all operational contracts of all cooperation 
agreements. 
4   Implementing Contract Monitoring and Enforcement 
As mentioned previously, norms lend themselves to a rule-based implementation. 
Furthermore, the utilization of templates and default norms is amenable to a frame-
based development of our normative environment. 
For these reasons, we are implementing our agent-based EI framework using the 
JESS shell [7] for norm representation and enforcement (a central component in our 
architecture). It incorporates features covering these two issues, besides consisting of 
a forward-chaining production system that easily fits the application of our norms and 
rules based on events (in our case institutional facts). JESS also includes the possibil-
ity to define modules, which may be used to organize sets of rules. This feature 
matches our norm contexts. 
Our monitoring services rely on a set of institutionally certified agents acknowledg-
ing actions related to real-world operations. At a first glance, we identify messaging, 
banking, and delivery tracking facilities (for information exchanges, monetary value 
transfers, and product delivery, respectively), which may be provided as Web services 
and permit a certified acknowledgement of real-world transactions. 
The enforcement of contracts is supported by the application of norms triggered by 
violations, whether those norms simply prescribe new obligations or impose restric-
tions on agents’ actions. Agents’ reputation is also affected by their own performance. 
This information may be later used by other agents when deciding on new contractual 
experiences. 
The effectiveness of contracts demands for the presence of an authoritative third-
party (as in [8], [11] or [14]). Moreover, if contract performance is to be monitored, 
the corresponding transactions must be registered. Another approach could be to delay 
compliance checking to situations in which conflicts arise and are complaint about. 
However, this raises problems related to agents’ subjective views on contract compli-
ance [3], unless irrefutable evidence is obtained regarding the involved transactions. 
Having said this, our environment providing the required supervision can be deployed 
in a decentralized manner, as there may be several institutionally certified agents ful-
filling each of the roles associated with the identified services. 
5   Conclusions and Related Work 
Enterprise interoperability is a growing concern in modern cooperative business. 
However, the need for flexible and dynamic relationships also demands for open set-
tings, in which potential partners may not have worked together in the past. The speci-
fication of contracts offers an alternative when non-legal sanctions (such as reputation 
mechanisms) are insufficient to constrain opportunism: parties expose themselves to 
legal sanctions for non-fulfillment of duties. 
Contracts specifying VE configurations have a different nature when compared to 
simple purchase contracts. They typically define cooperation agreements between 
several business partners, instead of detailing a predetermined normative path (i.e. a 
sequence of fixed obligations). A VE relationship has an ongoing nature, and some-
times a flexible structure, where partners may have to be replaced. 
Within the framework of our electronic institution providing contract-related ser-
vices, we have described our structured normative approach, in which norms have 
attached a context to which they apply. We also have introduced a declarative repre-
sentation for norms and their use in contracts, together with institutional rules that 
make a connection between institutional facts and obligations. A simple yet verifiable 
representation for a type of VE cooperation agreements was also shown, enabling a 
coarse-grained specification of business processes involving the flow of resources 
among partners, together with committed cooperation efforts. 
The concept of electronic institutions (and the more general topic of normative 
multi-agent systems) is being addressed by several researchers. Previous approaches 
towards regulating agent behavior through EIs include [13]. However, this model 
formally defines an institution using a rigid structure that implements a predefined 
protocol. It is thus not amenable to contract handling, as contracts typically alter the 
normative structure. In our approach, we avoid imposing hard constraints on agents’ 
behavior. Through the enforcement of norms, we do influence in some way the behav-
ior of rational agents (in this respect we are much more aligned with [15]). As for 
norm organization, in [5] a two-level approach is presented, considering norms at 
institutional and operational levels. 
The use of norms for contract specification is widely used (e.g. [8], [14]). Norms 
are typically related with the deontic notions of obligation, permission and prohibi-
tion. Most approaches to norm-based contract specifications deal with these issues, 
together with associated sanctions in case of violations. In our case, we essentially rely 
on directed obligations. In the case of VE contracts, permissions are seen as rights for 
requesting a partner’s contribution. Prohibitions are applied as a consequence of viola-
tion detection. 
The handling of VE contracts is not as much widespread. In [11] a business con-
tract architecture (with some similar components to our approach) can be found 
(though without a normative perspective). The idea is to provide strong electronic 
links between organizations that exchange messages carrying business documents, 
while preserving their individual processes and practices. However, the authors focus 
on inter-organizational collaborations in an extended enterprise setting (which can be 
simplistically seen as a VE with only two partners). 
Our work addresses issues related to VE interoperability through institutional ser-
vices provided in an agent-based environment. We therefore put an effort towards a 
regulated environment – by using concepts such as norms and institutions – that facili-
tates the employment of agents in a real-world complex problem. 
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